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Abstract 
 
This paper deals with real effects of bank-intermediated international capital flows to 11 CESEE coun-
tries 1997-2012. The purpose is to check for structural breaks in the short-run relationship between 
bank-intermediated capital flows and output growth since 2008. The relationship is investigated in 
dynamic panel growth regression framework. Results show that there was no systematic relationship 
between international banks' exposures and countries' growth rates at normal times. The relationship 
turned negative at times of crisis, implying that international banks did not cause or propagate negative 
output shocks in the period of great recession. Moreover, banks may have alleviated intensity of nega-
tive shocks by resisting reduction of country exposures in line with contracting GDP.  
 
Asset and liability side of local banks' balance sheets are separated by different kinds of capital and 
liquidity buffers. So, effects of lending in local credit markets on GDP growth should be looked at 
separately from international component on the liability side of banks’ balance sheets. When interna-
tional banks' exposures are replaced by local credit portfolios in panel growth regressions, the results 
change: (1) there is a positive relationship between credit to households and output growth: moreover, 
strength of positive relationship is magnified at times of crisis; (2) positive relationship between cor-
porate credit and output growth does not change at times of crisis. Thus, crisis-related household sec-
tor deleveraging may be much more costly in terms of output loss, than corporate sector deleveraging.  
Key policy implication is that maintaining the flow of credit to households has higher importance in 
combating the crisis in the short run than stimulating the flow of credit to non-financial corporations. 
Also, crisis-related household sector deleveraging may be much more costly in terms of output loss, 
than corporate sector deleveraging.   
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Is financial openness good for economic growth at all times, or is there too much of a good thing? The 
concept of too much of a good thing gained credibility after Duenwald, Gueourguiev and Schaechter 
(2005) identified overly rapid credit growth in Bulgaria, Romania and Ukraine before the beginning of 
great recession. Similar findings raised suspicion that capital inflows intermediated via international 
banks towards their subsidiaries in CESEE may led to unsustainable developments (e.g. Backe, Egert 
and Zumer, 2007). Outburst of a series of adverse shocks since 2008 seemingly confirmed earlier re-
servations: fundamental weaknesses in large European banks and sovereigns and subsequent delevera-
ging of banks were often interpreted as causes of protracted output contractions in New Europe.  
 
At the same time, a number of researchers emphasized a more nuanced approach to the same problem. 
Brezigar-Masten, Coricelli and Masten (2010) and Hartwell (2012) found that financial openness and 
liberalization had stabilizing effects at times of crisis.  
 
The dilemma can be interpreted within the wider framework of capital inflows – economic growth 
nexus. Economic literature on real effects of international capital flows after liberalization is inconclu-
sive. Results vary depending on periods, list of countries and types of capital flows included in the 
analysis. The purpose of this paper is to investigate real effects of bank-intermediated international 
capital flows to 11 CESEE countries 1997-2012. This period includes five years of great recession 
when individual countries’ growth rates in CESEE begun to diverge compared to years of great mode-
ration. Therefore main aim of this research is to check for structural breaks in the short-run relation-
ship between bank-intermediated capital flows and output growth since 2008 within dynamic panel 
growth regression framework. Regression includes controls for external shocks (export growth), FDI 
flows, domestic policies (fiscal policy and exchange rate) and banking crises (in Latvia and Slovenia). 
After proper control for these impacts, results show that there was no systematic relationship between 
international banks' exposures and countries' growth rates at normal times. The relationship turned 
negative at times of crisis, implying that international banks did not cause or propagate negative output 
shocks in the period of great recession. 
 
Asset and liability side of local banks' balance sheets are separated by different kinds of capital and 
liquidity buffers. Additional contribution of this work is reflected in investigation of effects of lending 
in local credit markets on GDP growth separately from international component on the liability side of 
banks’ balance sheets. When international banks' exposures are replaced by local credit portfolios in 
panel growth regressions, results show dominant effect of household loans at times of crisis. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. The first section presents a review of the related literature which 
elaborates the relationship between capital flows and GDP growth in a cross-country and panel data 
framework. The second section presents the simple descriptive statistics that unravels the rationale 
behind the idea for the paper. The model is presented in the third section. The fourth section contains a 
presentation of data, the econometric method and results. The interpretation of the results is presented 
in the fifth section. The sixth section concludes. 
 
1. Literature review 
 
Bailliu (2000) investigated the role of private capital ﬂows in the determination of economic growth 
using panel data for 40 developing countries from 1975–95. The results show that as long as domestic 
assets of commercial banks represent more than 58 per cent of the total assets of those banks and the 
central bank, the estimated effect of net capital ﬂows will be positive. In countries with poorly develo-
ped banking sectors, the effect of capital ﬂows on growth is found to be negative. This may be caused 
by a correlation between a low level of ﬁnancial sector development and government-imposed distor-
tions in the ﬁnancial sector.  
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Using a non-parametric approach and probit analysis on the sample of 62 (developed and developing) 
countries and 141 currency crisis episodes, Ito (2004) investigated the relationship between financial 
openness and the impact and duration of economic crisis. A higher pre-crisis level of financial open-
ness helps to reduce output losses for industrialized countries, but not for less developed and emerging 
market countries. Also, the duration of post-crisis output contraction can be shorter when an industria-
lized country has a higher level of financial openness, but for the group of emerging market countries, 
the duration of output contraction can be lengthened for a country with more open capital accounts. 
On the other hand, the post-crisis level of financial openness appeared to help industrialized countries 
reduce the magnitude of output losses, but in emerging market and less developed countries, the post-
crisis level of financial openness magnified output losses. 
 
The main hypothesis of Bussiere and Fratzscher (2008) is that a key reason for the elusive evidence of 
the financial openness-growth nexus is the presence of a time-varying relationship between openness 
and growth over time (broadly similar to the hypothesis investigated in this paper). There may be an 
intertemporal trade-off because countries tend to gain in the short-term, immediately following capital 
account liberalization, but may not grow faster or even experience temporary growth reversals in the 
medium- to long-term after the opening of the capital account. Authors used a standard (Barro, Sala-i-
Martin) growth model for 45 developing and developed countries in order to check for the impact of 
openness. The opening of the capital account led to a 1.5% higher growth during the first five years 
after liberalization, while growth in the longer run returned to or even below its pre-liberalization rate. 
 
Edwards (2008) investigated the relationship between capital flows, currency volatility (crisis) and 
economic growth in the sample of 157 countries on 1970-2001 data. The author wanted to understand 
whether the extent of capital mobility determines the depth of crisis (as measured by the decline in 
growth) once a crisis occurs. Countries that restricted capital mobility have not experienced milder 
crisis than countries which allowed for a freer mobility of capital. 
 
Garita (2009) analyzed the channels through which de facto financial openness affects economic 
growth and its components in the sample of 25 developed and 186 developing economies in the 1970-
2005 period. The author used a dynamic panel model in order to test the hypothesis that financial 
openness and different types of capital flows have a positive effect on economic growth. Data on FDI 
and portfolio inflows is used as a proxy for de facto financial openness. The findings are that FDI 
inflows positively affected growth of GDP per worker. These inflows also positively affected the 
growth rate of the capital stock per worker with (non-robust) evidence of crowding-in effects. Also, 
the results show that there is a significant and positive correlation between FDI inflows and TFP, in 
both developing and developed countries. 
 
Brezigar-Masten, Coricelli and Masten (2010) analyzed how financial integration and development 
affected the macroeconomic dynamics in 31 European countries after the beginning of the 2008 crisis. 
The authors conducted an empirical analysis in two stages using dynamic panel models. In the first 
stage, the authors evaluated the effects of finance on GDP. In the second stage, they evaluated whether 
financial integration stimulates the development of national financial markets. Financially more open 
countries experienced a smaller decline in the supply of finance and thus a smaller amplification of the 
business cycle through the finance-growth nexus. This result is in contrast to the view that financial 
integration and openness represented destabilizing factors in the recent financial crisis. 
 
Aizenman, Jinjark and Park (2011) analyzed the relationship between economic growth and disaggre-
gated capital flows from 1990 to 2010 using cross-section and panel regression models. The main 
results on the sample of about 100 developed and developing countries show that effects of capital 
flows on GDP growth depend on the types of flows, economic structure, global patterns of growth and 
the analyzed period (before or during the crisis). FDI flows have a significant and positive effect on 
GDP growth during the entire sample period, including the crisis period. The relationship between 
equity flows alone
1
 and growth is smaller and unstable, while the effect of short-term debt is nil before 
                                                                        
1 Mainly abstracting from reinvested earnings. 
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the crisis, but negative and large during the crisis. It is important to emphasize that such negative ef-
fect is more significant in countries with weaker institutions. 
 
Aslanoglu and Deniz (2012) investigated the transmission mechanism that works from financial open-
ness and (exchange rate) stability to economic growth in developing countries from 2000 to 2010. The 
finding is that the impact on growth is conditional on (i) the host economy’s being able to attract fore-
ign funds, and (ii) central bank of the host economy’s exchange rate stability policy. In the empirical 
section of the paper the authors construct a stability in openness index (SIO), which is composed of 
portfolio investment inflows and the exchange rate volatility indicator, and conduct a causality 
analysis (between SIO and industrial production) using the Geweke’s measure of linear feedback. 
Their results suggest that SIO has a positive impact on economic growth in case of eight (of totally 
nine) analyzed countries. Among them, only Russia reflects a short run relationship, while the rest 
reflects a long run relationship between stability and growth. 
 
Hartwell (2012) examined interrelationship between financial liberalization, the probability of a ban-
king crisis and the performance of several economic indicators during periods of crisis as a function of 
financial sector liberalization and other institutional factors. Using a dataset of 28 transition countries 
from 1989-2012, Hartwell concluded that the probability of a crisis is smaller in transition economies 
with a liberalized financial sector and that liberalization can help to moderate the effects of a crisis 
when it does strike. The results also indicate that the quality of institutions (in this case, property 
rights) is most important for safeguarding against a crisis and mitigating its effects. 
 
The literature is inconclusive. Some research (e.g. Edwards, 2008; Brezigar-Masten, Corricelli and 
Masten, 2010; Hartwell, 2012) point out benefits of financial openness, even at times of crises. Others 
point at a different impact of different types of capital flows (Aizenman, Jinjark and Park, 2011, and 
Garita, 2009), instability of the relationship over time (Bussiere and Fratzscher, 2008) or across coun-
tries, depending on their level of development (Bailliu, 2000; Ito, 2004). The possibility of context-
dependency regarding the relationship between capital inflows (especially bank-intermediated capital 
inflows) and economic growth calls for a deeper investigation of this relationship in the context of 
CESEE countries before and after the crisis of 2008/09. 
 
2. Stylized facts: where the research idea came from 
 
The average rate of output growth was speeding up until 2007 in 11 CESEE countries (Fig. 1). The 
recovery after the 2009 slump was mild, with a pause during the second leg of the European recession 
in 2012. On average, the pattern of growth in CESEE closely resembles the growth pattern in the EU-
15 (Fig. 2).
2
 Moreover, cross-country growth differences (as reflected in the cross-country standard 
deviation of growth rates – Fig. 1) increased during the Great Recession. This means that the magnitu-
de of the 2009 shock was very different across CESEE, but the shock was persistent: the cross-country 




                                                                        
2 The linear correlation of annual output growth between EU-15 and CESEE-11 is 81% on average. However, country specific 
correlations are weaker and diverse. 
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FIG. 1: AVERAGE GDP GROWTH AND ITS 
STANDARD DEVIATION IN CESEE-11, 1997-
2012    
FIG. 2: AVERAGE GDP GROWTH IN CESEE-
11 AND EU-15, 1997-2012 
 
 
Source: Eurostat.         Source: Eurostat. 
 
The dynamics of FDI capital inflows shows that the lower average ratio of FDI to GDP during the 
crisis was accompanied by greater similarity across countries (lower standard deviation) compared to 
the period before the crisis (Fig. 3). Similarities measured by the standard deviation of FDI flows to 
GDP ratios decreased when the average ratio begun to pick up in 2012 thanks to the strong but isolated 
revival of FDIs in the Czech Republic, Estonia and Latvia. This is an example of a broader pattern of 
widening cross-country differences in real developments in CESEE after 2008. 
 
FIG. 3: AVERAGE FDI/GDP INFLOW AND 
ITS STANDARD DEVIATION IN CESEE-11,  
1997-2012 
FIG. 4: AVERAGE CHANGE IN INTL’ 
BANKS’ EXPOSURE TO CESEE-11 IN % OF 
GDP AND ITS STANDARD DEVIATION, 
1998-2012 
 
Source: UNCTAD.       Source: BIS. 
 
Bank-related capital inflow is measured by changes in BIS reporting banks’ exposures to all sectors in 
CESEE countries in % of local GDP. Banks’ exposure behaved markedly differently in comparison to 
FDI to GDP ratios. There were no increased cross-country correlations as there were with FDI 
inflows. The standard deviation of cross-country bank-related capital inflows remained elevated du-
ring the crisis, but the maximum deviation was observed before the crisis, in 2005 and 2006. Figures 5 
and 6 show correlations between changes in international banks’ exposures to local GDPs (BIS data) 
and output changes before (2002-2008) and during the crisis (2009-2012). The relationship was weak 
before the crisis (Fig. 5). Then there seems to be a structural break: the relationship reversed the sign 
and got stronger (Fig. 6). Somewhat paradoxically, the stronger decline in bank-related capital inflows 
was associated with higher output growth. This might happen due to the indicator’s construction (GDP 
is in the denominator of the BIS measure of inflows) or it may reflect a more important phenomenon 
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FIG. 5: COUNTRY-YEAR CHANGES IN 
INTL’ BANKS’ EXPOSURE TO CESEE-11 IN 
% OF GDP VS. OUTPUT CHANGE, 2002-2008 
FIG. 6: COUNTRY-YEAR CHANGES IN INTL 
BANKS’ EXPOSURE TO CESEE-11 IN % OF 
GDP VS. OUTPUT CHANGE, 2009-2012 
 
Sources: BIS and Eurostat.         Sources: BIS and Eurostat. 
 
A plausible explanation is the following: most large banks in CESEE held significant capital and 
liquidity buffers throughout the Great Recession, especially at its early stages. Capital and liquidity 
buffers may have enabled large international banks to meet the healthy local credit demand or, at least, 
allowed banks to avoid a pro-cyclical credit crunch, irrespective of the shocks absorbed on the foreign 
liabilities’ side of banks’ balance sheet. On top of it, international shocks may have been weak or ab-
sent if international banks lent support to local subsidiary banks in CESEE by maintaining exposures 
or resisting decrease in exposures in line with contracting GDP. Absent this channel of international 
shocks, domestic output remained primarily driven by real and structural (external as well as domes-
tic) shocks. This is a narratively expressed hypothesis which needs to be tested in a more formal way. 
 
3. Model to be tested 
 
The model specification is simple: real GDP growth (y) depends on the real external shock of export 
growth (ex), capital flows intermediated via banks (termed BIS due to the data source), FDI flows and 
the vector of domestic policy variables (P), which includes fiscal policy and the exchange rate: 
                    (1) 
Real external shocks (ex) are obviously exogenous, but there might be multi co-linearity among the 
right-hand side variables. For example, while a positive external shock has a positive expected effect 
on growth it may also positively affect capital flows (BIS), therefore producing second-order effects 
on growth via a push factor that affects capital inflows. In addition, more FDIs may lead to a higher 
demand for foreign bank funding (BIS). Finally, reverse causality may work from growth y to fiscal 
policy P, as changes in fiscal policy may be easier to implement in an environment of robust economic 
growth. 
 
The next problem is associated with the fact that domestic private sector credit (C) is privately produ-
ced. Policy control over credit is only indirect, hence very imperfect, especially in countries where the 
interest rate channel does not work or works very imperfectly. So it is more appropriate to look at pri-
vate credit supply separately from policy variables: 
                      (2) 
The possibility of reverse causality is obvious (y implies demand for C), but a number of additional 
linkages between C and P, FDI and BIS also emerge. Complexities of this kind are hard to control 
even in a developed structural model. Rather than trying to develop such a model, all kinds of multi 
co-linearities and reverse causations were controlled by employing an econometric method allowing 
for endogeneity, which are discussed in the next section. 
 
The relationship between capital flows intermediated via banks (BIS) and economic growth (y) is of 
special interest in this paper. The standard assumption is that growth is affected by capital inflows 
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symmetrically in both good and bad times. But in this paper we based our analysis on the hypothesis 
that there was a structural break in this relationship at times of crisis in CESEE. So we included slope 
dummy variables to determine the importance of the effects of this structural break. By including a 
dummy variable we extended our model to the form: 
                              (3) 
where BIS2008 =D*BIS, and D is dummy equal to 1 from 2008 onwards. Note that significant para-
meter with BIS2008 implies a structural break in the relationship between capital inflows and econo-
mic growth. The key issue is how to interpret different types of structural breaks when parameter with 
BIS is positive: 
1. If the parameter with BIS2008 is positive, the eventual contraction of capital inflows interme-
diated via banks has a stronger negative impact on output growth during financial turmoil than 
during good times. This result would support the widespread narrative about the critical role 
of sustaining and recovering capital inflows in combating crisis. The potential cyclical 
variability of the impact would imply that the banks’ role in financially open environments 
may be negative overall, even if the duration of times of turmoil is shorter than the duration of 
periods of financial moderation. 
2. If the parameter with BIS2008 reverses sign and sum of this parameter and parameter with 
BIS is still positive, the contraction of capital inflows intermediated via banks during financial 
turmoil leads to GDP contraction, but this effect is smaller than the positive effect of capital 
inflows during moderate times. This result would confirm the widespread narrative about the 
critical role of capital inflows in sustaining growth, but it would leave open the possibility for 
the overall positive impact of capital inflows intermediated via banks on GDP growth in the 
long run.  
3. If the sum of parameters reverses sign and turns negative at times of turmoil, different inter-
pretations emerge. A normatively bad interpretation would be that stronger capital inflows at 
times of turmoil cause negative growth if inflows are intermediated towards an inefficient and 
corruptive government or zombie corporations which waste resources and/or tie them in inef-
ficient uses, paying ever higher interest rates. This would certainly induce an economic slump. 
However, the problem with this interpretation is that financial intermediaries lend money to 
debtors that are unable to ever repay, which is irrational. An alternative, normatively good in-
terpretation is that relatively larger international exposures towards local banks in weaker 
markets reflect support for local banks in order to withstand negative local shocks. In this ca-
se, banks’ stability may prevent propagation of even stronger negative impulses at times of 
crisis. For example, if a relatively higher international exposure at times of crisis is related to 
additional capitalization for absorption of losses, or if it substitutes (and/or prevents) for 
withdrawal of domestic deposits from local banks, that is certainly helpful for financial 
stability and the economy in gloom. This thesis is in line with Brezigar-Masten et al.’s (2010) 
findings. This is the essence of what we call the bank buffer hypothesis. 
 
There is another way to approach the same hypothesis – by looking at domestic credit (C) directly and 
constructing C2008 in the same way as BIS2008 and substituting C for BIS in (3). Therefore, the mo-
del becomes: 
                            (4) 
Significant differences between parameters with C2008 and BIS2008 would indicate separation of the 
asset side from shocks to the foreign liabilities’ side of banks’ balance sheets. This is a direct way to 
test the bank buffer hypothesis. 
 
4. Data and econometric method 
 
The sample consists of eleven CESEE countries from 1997 to 2012 (a sample of total 176 observati-
ons). The dependent variable is the real GDP growth rate. Right-hand side (explanatory) variables can 
be divided in four main categories: (i) bank-related external shocks (BIS reporting international banks’ 
exposures in terms of GDP of CESEE countries); (ii) non-bank related external shocks, which can be 
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divided in “global” shocks (real growth of exports) and country-specific external shocks (FDI flows in 
% of GDP); (iii) domestic policy variables (general government deficit, expenditures and revenues in 
% of GDP and the nominal exchange rate
3
); and (iv) domestic credit (loans to households and loans to 
non-financial corporations). Table 1 below shows a representation of variables used in the analysis and 
the data sources. 
 
Table 1: Data description 











BIS reporting banks’ 






EXPORT_GROWTH Real growth of exports % Eurostat 
FDIFLOW 










































*CNB – Croatian National Bank 
 
The analysis includes several intercept and slope dummy variables which capture the effects of various 
structural breaks. Dummy2008 captures the effect of the crisis and recession in 2008-2012 (which can 
be interpreted as a regime-switch). Dummyshock2009 captures the effect of 2009 alone, which is the 
year when all countries in the sample recorded the largest economic declines. Bank crisis dummy cap-
tures the effects of the banking crisis in Slovenia (2009-2012) and Latvia (2009). Among slope 
dummy variables we use BIS2008 and credit growth2008 dummy variables, which capture the structu-
ral break in the relationship between capital inflows or credit growth and economic growth. 
 
In order to test our hypothesis we estimated a dynamic panel regression model of the form: 
                                           (5) 
The dependent variable appears in the reporting tables in the Appendix as GROWTH. Matrix X inclu-
des explanatory variables which appear individually in separate specifications: the ratio of general 
government balance to GDP (FISCAL_BALANCE)
4
, the ratio of FDI flows to GDP (FDIFLOW), the 
nominal effective exchange rate (EXCHANGE_RATE), the share of general government revenues in 
GDP (GOV_REVENUES), the share of general government expenditure in GDP 
(GEN_GOV_EXPEND), real growth of loans to households (LOANHOUSE_GROWTH_REAL), and 
real growth of loans to non-financial corporations (LOANCORP_GROWTH_REAL). 
                                                                        
3 Due to the unavailability of data, revenues and expenditures for Croatia are at the central government level and are obtained 
from the statistics of the Croatian National Bank (CNB) and IMF reports. 
4 Note that the balance implies that a positive parameter means that a lower deficit/higher surplus is associated with GDP growth 
and vice versa. 
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There are two control variables which appear in all equations: growth of total exports 
(EXPORT_GROWTH) and the ratio of bank-intermediated capital flows to GDP (BIS). In tests of the 
bank buffer hypothesis BIS is replaced by LOANHOUSE_GROWTH_REAL and LOAN-
CORP_GROWTH_REAL. 
 
The model includes the following dummy variables: DUMMY2008, which takes the value of 1 in the 
period 2008-2012, DUMMYSHOCK2009, which takes the value of 1 in 2009 and BANKCRISISLS, 
which takes the value of 1 in case of Slovenia from 2009-2012 and Latvia in 2009. A special role is 
assigned to slope dummy BIS2008 (=DUMMY2008*BIS), which is replaced by LOANHOU-
SE_GROWTH_REAL08 and LOANCORP_GROWTH_REAL 08  (LOANHOU-
SE_GROWTH_REAL08 =dummy2008* LOANHOUSE_GROWTH_REAL and LOAN-
CORP_GROWTH_REAL 08=DUMMY2008 *LOANCORP_GROWH_REAL) in tests of the bank 
buffer hypothesis. 
 
The choice of estimators depends on the relationship between time and space dimensions of the sam-
ple. The LSDV, the Anderson-Hsiao (1981, 1983), the difference GMM (Arellano and Bond, 1991) 
and the system GMM (Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998) estimators are appropriate 
when the space dimension dominates the time dimension. The Pesaran and Smith (1995) and the Pesa-
ran, Shin and Smith (1999) estimator is appropriate for very large models, which cannot be applied 
here, given the 11 countries and 16 years of data. Standard LSDV is biased even when t=20, but it has 
minimum variance compared to other estimators. Kiviet (1995) calculated the correction for bias and 
proposed the corrected LSDV estimator (LSDVC). A simulation by Judson and Owen (1999) has 
shown that LSDVC is the most appropriate estimator for samples like the one used here. The other 
optimum solution is a one-step GMM estimator (Arellano and Bond, 1991). Similar results are obtai-
ned by Buddelmeyer, Jensen, Oguzoglu and Webster (2008). However, LSDVC is based on the as-
sumption of strict exogeneity of regressors. This is highly unlikely here, as explained before. Also note 
that there are explanatory variables with GDP in the denominator on the right-hand side of the 
equation which may aggravate the endogeneity problem. In addition, to our knowledge, the Arellano 
and Bover (1995) and the Blundell and Bond (1998) estimators have not been subject to simulations in 
smaller samples. For that reason, we used a one-step GMM estimator which allows for endogeneity. 
 
GMM is based on the use of a lagged dependent variable and regressor in levels as an instrument. The-
refore, the Sargan test is used to choose the model. If residuals are homoscedastic, Sargan's statistic 
has a chi-square asymptotic distribution. Parameter consistency requires the absence of autocorrelation 
up to the second order.  
 
GMM is based on regression of the first difference of the dependent variable (           against reg-
ressor variables (             and (          -s. Since the variable             is surely correla-
ted with residuals            , the method of instrumental variables is proposed as an estimation 
solution. The instrumental variables suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991) are lags of the dependent 
variable as well as lags of regressors in levels. The validity of these instruments is tested using the 
Sargan test where the null hypothesis tests if the over-identifying restrictions are valid. Also, an opti-
mal number of instruments is needed to accept a null without significantly increasing estimator bias. 
Hence, the Sargan test is used to choose the model. If residuals are homoscedastic, Sargan's statistic 
has a chi-square asymptotic distribution. Also, test of autocorrelation among residual differences must 
be conducted. If the autocorrelation of the first order is confirmed, parameter consistency is not viola-
ted (hence it is ignored). The serial correlation of residual differences of the second order makes the 
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5. Results5 
Results (see the Appendix) show that economic growth in CESEE countries represents an AR process 
with a key role played by real international shocks. This is reflected in positive and highly significant 
parameters with export growth in all specifications. The result lends a strong support to the hypothesis 
about the dominance of real channels in crisis transmission. 
 
Results presented in Table A1.1 in the Appendix show that the dummy variable BIS2008 is 
statistically significant in all specifications. The lagged value of this variable is also significant in all 
specifications, except in the specification with household loan growth. The size and signs of estimated 
coefficients indicate that the “cumulative” effect of a structural break in BIS flows is negative. This 
indicates higher bank-intermediated capital inflows to GDP in relation to GDP when GDP contracts 
and vice versa. The result may reflect support by international lenders to local banks and other 
borrowers at times of real distress. A possible objection to this interpretation is that the result is due to 
endogeneity because GDP is used in the denominator of the regressor. However, if international banks 
keep their exposures unchanged when local GDP is contracting (even if exposures decrease but less 
than GDP which leads to an increase in BIS), this indeed shows the support for local banks and mar-
kets. International lenders at least abstain from proportional withdrawals of international financing 
despite a contraction in local GDP. 
Estimated parameters with current and lagged values of the variable BIS throughout the whole estima-
tion period are not statistically significant in any specification. This is an interesting finding: while 
during the boom phase there were no obvious benefits of international banking integration, there are 
potential benefits at times of crisis because of the negative relationship between capital inflows inter-
mediated via banks and economic growth. 
 
Next, the results in Table A1.2 indicate a statistically significant structural break in the series of hou-
sehold loan growth in all specifications. The parameter with a dummy version of the variable (active at 
times of crisis) is positive, which indicates an amplified positive influence of household loan growth at 
times of turmoil compared to normal times. An implication is that if loans to households grow during 
the crisis, they have a stronger impact on growth than in moderate times. Effect of their eventual dec-
line is amplified, too. No similar effect is found with regards to corporate loans. Their relationship to 
GDP growth did not change in the great recession. 
 
Furthermore, there is no statistically significant effect of aggregate FDI flows on GDP growth. This 
does not necessarily imply that FDI flows are not important for growth. A statistical construction of 





The main conclusion related to domestic policy variables is that the effects of fiscal balance and gene-
ral government expenditures are statistically significant in all specifications. The sign of coefficients 
with these variables indicates that an improvement in fiscal balance has positive, while growth of ge-
neral government expenditures has negative effects on GDP growth. The effects of general gover-
nment revenues are not statistically significant in any version. These results may indicate that fiscally 
prudent countries which based their fiscal consolidation on the expenditure side had a better growth 
performance. One should interpret this with caution due to a possible endogeneity effect (again, GDP 
is in the denominator of the regressor). However, as the variability of nominal fiscal variables is higher 
on average than the variability of nominal GDP, the causality may indeed run from fiscal policy to 
output change. 
 
The effect of the exchange rate level is statistically significant in only one version of the equation, 
which implies a negative relationship between exchange rate depreciation in the previous period and 
speed of GDP growth. This can indicate that negative (destabilizing) effects of depreciation (e.g. in-
crease in the value of foreign currency denominated debt) could have offset the positive effects on 
                                                                        
5 Detailed results of various model specifications are presented in the Appendix. 
6 The true impact of FDI flows should be tested at firm-level which is beyond the scope of this paper.   
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export growth in some countries. However, this result should be treated with great caution because it is 
not confirmed in other specifications and may be purely random. 
 
The results indicate that the dummy2008 (which takes the value of 1 in period 2008-2012) and the 
dummyshock09 (which simulates the effect of the 2009 shock when all countries in the sample 
experienced the strongest economic slowdown) are statistically significant in all specifications in Ver-
sion 1. The cumulative effect (the sum of the coefficient with current and lagged values) on GDP 
growth is negative in case of both dummy variables, but the effect of the 2009 shock is (as expected) 
much stronger. The purpose of inclusions of these dummies was to test whether the main results hold 
with growth critical dummies switched on and off. No significant changes in the main results occurred 
in models with vs without great recession dummies, showing their robustness. The results with dum-
mies are reported for convenience. 
 
Finally, the banking crisis dummy is statistically significant in all specifications in Versions 2 and 3 
(with credit variables as the main explanatory variables) and in 4 out of 7 specifications in Version 1. 
In Version 1, the effects are not statistically significant in specifications with fiscal balance and the 
exchange rate. A lagged positive value implies that the negative impact of the banking crisis on GDP 
is alleviated in the second year after the inception of the banking crisis, but a net negative effect still 
remains. Also, the significance of lagged values occurs sporadically. For that reason, no lagged ban-
king crisis is included in Version 2. Parameters are even more negative in versions without other 
dummies, which are not reported here. The finding of a severe negative effect of the banking crisis on 




There are no indications that international banks caused or propagated adverse shocks at times of crisis 
in CESEE when effects of real international and domestic policy shocks on output variability are 
properly accounted for. Neither there are indications that pre-crisis capital inflows intermediated via 
international banks had significant positive impact on the short-run GDP growth. However, internatio-
nal banks may have alleviated shocks by retaining exposures, or at least by resisting decrease in 
exposures in line with GDP towards countries with contracting outputs. The result can be interpreted 
within a broader set of economic research that found positive impact of international financial liberali-
zation at times of crisis. 
 
Short run output developments are largely explained by real international shocks reflected in growth of 
exports, banking crises and evolution of loan portfolios. Key policy conclusions in this respect are the 
following. First, support for exporters at times of crisis (besides depreciating exchange rate which has 
no significant impact on output growth) may be critical for alleviating adverse effects. Second, 
stability of banks i.e. avoiding severe banking sector problems like in Latvia and Slovenia saves seve-
ral percentages of GDP. This is in line with earlier research that showed significantly negative effects 
of banking crisis. It also shows benefits of international financial integration because Latvia and Slo-
venia had the lowest share of banks’ total assets controlled by international banks in the sample of 11 
CESEE countries before the crisis. Last but not least, the results have shown that (1) there is a positive 
relationship between credit to households and output growth: moreover, strength of positive relation-
ship is magnified at times of crisis; (2) positive relationship between corporate credit and output 
growth breaks down at times of crisis: parameter becomes insignificant.  Key policy implication is that 
maintaining the flow of credit to households has higher importance in combating the crisis in the short 
run than stimulating the flow of credit to non-financial corporations. Also, crisis-related household 
sector deleveraging may be much more costly in terms of output loss, than corporate sector delevera-
ging.   
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Appendix: Results 
 















L.growth 0.36 0.43 0.38 0.42 0.35 0.26 0.28 
  (0.09)*** (0.08)*** (0.09)*** (0.08)*** (0.08)*** (0.09)*** (0.08)*** 
L2.growth -0.21036 -0.23587 -0.27838 -0.2305 -0.1997 -0.23957 -0.27049 
  (0.07)*** (0.07)*** (0.07)*** (0.07)*** (0.07)*** (0.06)*** (0.06)*** 
dummy2008 5.3 6.16 6.24 5.85 5.04 5.22 4.16 
  (1.69)*** (1.75)*** (1.73)*** (1.75)*** (1.67)*** (1.63)*** (1.62)** 
L.dummy2008 -5.71 -6.39 -6.57 -6.47 -6.21 -4.59 -4.72 
  (1.80)*** (1.90)*** (1.84)*** (1.88)*** (1.77)*** (1.77)*** (1.72)*** 
dummyshock09 -3.07 -3.92 -3.94 -4.29 -3.69 -3.76 -3.89 
  (1.18)*** (1.21)*** (1.20)*** (1.22)*** (1.15)*** (1.12)*** (1.09)*** 
L.dummyshock09 4.72 4.74 4.34 4.44 4.15 3.25 3.44 
  (1.25)*** (1.31)*** (1.30)*** (1.33)*** (1.25)*** (1.25)*** (1.22)*** 
bankcrisisls -2.3 -2.71 -2.51 -3.02 -2.72 -3.25 -2.93 
  (1.50) (1.58)* (1.53) (1.55)* (1.47)* (1.45)** (1.41)** 
L.bankcrisisls 2.94 2.62 2.36 2.59 3.01 1.91 2.46 
  (1.58)* (1.64) (1.62) (1.64) (1.56)* (1.54) (1.49)* 
export_growth 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.09 0.08 
  (0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)** (0.02)*** (0.02)*** 
L.export_growth 0.0 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Fiscal_balance 0.35             
  (0.11)***             
L.fiscal_balance -0.04             
  (0.11)             
bis2008 -16.16 -18.3 -18.25 -17.86 -16.09 -14.77 -13.3 
  (3.05)*** (3.13)*** (3.09)*** (3.13)*** (3.01)*** (2.99)*** (2.99)*** 
L.bis2008 6.25 7.63 7.21 8.49 7.52 4.96 6.03 
  (3.37)* (3.52)** (3.45)** (3.50)** (3.30)** -3.31 (3.18)* 
bis 3.59 4.88 6.8 6.76 4.91 0.36 -0.55 
  (3.98) (4.32) (4.04) (4.16) (3.92) (3.99) (3.94) 
L.bis -0.61 -0.86 -2.96 -2.85 -0.71 3.03 1.73 
  (4.69) (5.12) (4.79) (4.93) (4.67) (4.65)    (4.53) 
fdiflow   0.07           
    (0.06)           
L.fdiflow   -0.04           
    (0.06)           
Exchange_rate     0.06         
      (0.04)         
L.exchange_rate     -0.05         
      (0.03)**         
gov_revenues       -0.1       
        (0.12)       
L.gov_revenues       0.04       
        (0.11)       
gen_gov_expend         -0.38     
          (0.10)***     
L.gen_gov_expend         0.14     
          (0.1)     
loanhouse_growth_real           0.03   
            (0.01)***   
L.loanhouse_growth_real           0.02   
            (0.01)**   
loancorp_growth_real             0.05 
              (0.02)*** 
L.loancorp_growth_real             0.05 
              (0.02)*** 
_cons 3.51 2.09 2.12 4.48 12.28 1.29 2.7 
  (0.84)*** (0.69)*** (1.98) (4.08) (3.94)*** (0.64)** (0.61)*** 
Sargan test  117.2 117.7 114 120.1 118.2 106.4 112.8 
chi2 586.92 530.6 549.49 529.92 601.25 634.84 669.71 
Number of instruments 136 136 136 136 136 134 134 
Sargan p-value 0.5295 0.5165 0.6123 0.4545 0.5035 0.7489 0.5926 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Table A1.2 


















L.growth 0.25 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.23 0.29 0.3 0.31 
 (0.07)*** (0.07)*** (0.07)*** (0.07)*** (0.07)*** (0.07)*** (0.08)*** (0.07)*** 
L2.growth -0.22239 -0.2362 -0.2367 -0.23571 -0.21478 -0.23641 -0.23782 -0.22897 
 (0.05)*** (0.05)*** (0.05)*** (0.05)*** (0.05)*** (0.05)*** (0.05)*** (0.055*** 
bankcrisisls -3.01 -3.71 -3.89 -3.7 -3.19 -3.8 -3.79 -3.56 
 (1.12)*** (1.16)*** (1.13)*** (1.15)*** (1.09)*** (1.16)*** (1.14)*** (1.16)*** 
dummy2008 -3.04 -3.26 -3.45 -3.05 -2.98 -3.2 -3.25 -3.53 
 (0.94)*** (0.97)*** (0.98)*** (0.98)*** (0.92)*** (0.98)*** (0.98)*** (1.12)*** 
L.dummy2008 1.49 2.18 2.1 1.75 1.4 1.91 1.82 2.11 
 (1.18) (1.22)* (1.22)* (1.23) (1.16)     (1.27) (1.22) (1.27)* 
dummyshock09 -6.13 -6.89 -6.92 -6.77 -6.07 -6.83 -6.77 -6.93 
 (1.16)*** (1.19)*** (1.19)*** (1.20)*** (1.15)*** (1.22)*** (1.20)*** (1.27)*** 
L.dummyshock09 2.31 2.14 2.03 2.14 1.99 2.01 2.19 2 
 (1.19)* (1.23)* (1.22)* (1.24)* (1.16)* (1.23) (1.27)* (1.27) 
export_growth 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.06 0.09 0.09 0.09 
 (0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)*** 
Fiscal_balance 0.3        
 (0.09)***        
loanhouse_growth_real 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 
 (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** 
L.loanhouse_growth_real 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 
 (0.01)** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)** 
loanhouse_growth_real_08 0.1 0.12 0.13 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.12 
 (0.05)** (0.05)** (0.05)*** (0.05)** (0.05)** (0.05)** (0.05)** (0.05)** 
L.loanhouse_growth_real_08 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.08 
 (0.05)* (0.05) (0.05)* (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
fdiflow  0.06       
  (0.05)       
exchange_rate   -0.02      
   (0.02)      
gov_revenues    -0.06     
    (0.09)     
gen_gov_expend     -0.37    
     (0.10)***    
L.gen_gov_expend     0.17    
     (0.09)*    
loanhouse_real      0   
      0   
loancorp_real       0  
       0  
bis        1.2 
        (1.41) 
_cons 3.13 1.47 3.47 4.19 10.79 1.87 1.87 1.43 
 (0.64)*** (0.56)*** (1.68)** (3.33) (3.71)*** (0.51)*** (0.61)*** (0.56)** 
Sargan test  127 129.8 127.3 127.4 126 123.3 125.6 122.5 
chi2 683.5 632.73 631.51 611.44 712.9 624.53 622.66 609.06 
Number of instruments 138 138 138 138 136 138 139 138 
Sargan p-value 0.4086 0.3428 0.4013 0.3989 0.3595 0.5009 0.4681 0.5212 
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L.growth 0.33 0.35 0.33 0.32 0.3 0.32 0.33 0.33 
  (0.08)*** (0.08)*** (0.08)*** (0.08)*** (0.08)*** (0.08)*** (0.08)*** (0.08)*** 
L2.growth -0.26048 -0.29513 -0.30566 -0.27994 -0.242 -0.28318 -0.28894 -0.28144 
  (0.06)*** (0.06)*** (0.06)*** (0.06)*** (0.06)*** (0.06)*** (0.06)*** (0.06)*** 
dummy2008 -2.71 -2.66 -2.82 -2.79 -2.52 -2.77 -2.59 -2.04 
  (0.84)*** (0.83)*** (0.83)*** (0.83)*** (0.80)*** (0.84)*** (0.84)*** (0.97)** 
L.dummy2008 0.4 0.62 0.44 0.55 0.15 0.95 0.54 0.16 
  (1.07) (1.1) (1.07) (1.07) (1.03) (1.12) (1.07) (1.09) 
dummyshock09 -4.79 -5.4 -5.2 -5.16 -4.42 -5.76 -5.29 -4.64 
  (1.15)*** (1.17)*** (1.15)*** (1.14)*** (1.13)*** (1.19)*** (1.14)*** (1.20)*** 
L.dummyshock09 3.87 3.51 3.34 3.2 3.35 3.21 3.3 3.61 
  (1.26)*** (1.29)*** (1.28)*** (1.29)** (1.22)*** (1.28)** (1.29)** (1.29)*** 
bankcrisisls -3.41 -3.44 -3.64 -3.72 -3.4 -3.88 -3.63 -3.48 
  (1.42)** (1.47)** (1.44)** (1.43)*** (1.38)** (1.45)*** (1.44)** (1.46)** 
L.bankcrisisls 2.53 2.3 2.17 2.3 2.58 2.14 2.2 2.28 
  (1.56) (1.58) (1.56) (1.56) (1.50)* (1.57) (1.57) (1.58) 
export_growth 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.09 
  (0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)*** 
L.export_growth -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Fiscal balance 0.27               
  (0.12)**               
L.fiscal_balance -0.07               
  (0.11)               
loancorp_growth_real_08 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0 
  (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
L.loancorp_growth_real_08 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.07 0.04 0.02 
  (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
loancorp_growth_real 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.06 
  (0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)*** 
L.loancorp_growth_real 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.06 
  (0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)*** 
fdiflow   0.05             
    (0.06)             
L.fdiflow   -0.01             
    (0.06)             
exchange_rate     0.02           
      (0.04)           
L.exchange_rate     -0.02           
      (0.03)           
gov_revenues       -0.18         
        (0.11)         
L.gov_revenues       0.12         
        (0.11)         
gen_gov_expend         -0.34       
          (0.10)***       
L.gen_gov_expend         0.21       
          (0.10)**       
loanhouse_real           0     
            0     
loancorp_real             0   
              0   
bis               -2.88 
                (3.91) 
L.bis               0.42 
                (4.28) 
_cons 3.26 2.34 3.18 4.96 8.07 2.51 2.73 2.91 
  (0.77)*** (0.62)*** (2.03) (3.85) (3.98)** (0.57)*** (0.66)*** (0.63)*** 
Sargan test  128.5 126 123.9 130.5 128.3 123.5 124.7 122.1 
chi2 618.15 597.07 601.87 604.94 662.83 599.22 598.81 596.75 
Number of instruments 134 134 134 134 134 134 134 134 
Sargan p-value 0.2201 0.2685 0.3135 0.1857 0.2238 0.3225 0.2959 0.3549 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
 
 
 
